REFORMING THE COMMON LAW RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES
ROBERT J. LYNN"

1959 the Washington legislature enacted a statute that applies both
"wait and see" and "cy pres" principles to the provisions of a trust instrument violating the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.'

N

Although the statute is unique, the notions it incorporates are not new. But
in one respect it creates a differentiation of property interests not worth encouraging. The statute applies to beneficial interests. Legal interests are unaffected by the statute unless originating in an instrument creating a trust or
unless accorded equivalent treatment by Washington courts as a matter of
consistency in perpetuities cases. 2
If reformation of the Rule is attainable only through legislation as ineptly
drawn as the Washington statute, curing the defects that the Rule unquestiont Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
I The first three sections of the Washington statute are as follows:

"11.98.010 Violation of rule against perpetuities by instrument-Periods during which
trust not invalid. If any provision of an instrument creating a trust shall violate the rule
against perpetuities, neither such provision nor any other provisions of the trust shall thereby
be rendered invalid during any of the following periods:
"(1) The twenty-one years following the effective date of the instrument.
"(2) The period measured by any life or lives in being or conceived at the effective date of
the instrument if by the terms of the instrument the trust is to continue for such life or lives.
"(3) The period measured by any portion of any life or lives in being or conceived at the
effective date of the instrument if by the terms of the instrument the trust is to continue for
such portion of such life or lives; and
"(4) The twenty-one years following the expiration of the periods specified in (2) and (3)
above. [1959 c 146 § 1.]
"11.98.020 Distribution of assets and vesting of interest during period trust not invalid.
If, during any period in which an instrument creating a trust or any provision thereof is not
to be rendered invalid by the rule against perpetuities, any of the trust assets should by the
terms of the instrument become distributable or any beneficial interest therein should by the
terms of the instrument become vested, such assets shall be distributed and such beneficial
interest shall validly vest in accordance with the instrument. [1959 c 146 § 2.]
"11.98.030 Distribution of assets at expiration of period. If, at the expiration of any
period in which an instrument creating a trust or any provision thereof is not to be rendered
invalid by the rule against perpetuities, any of the trust assets have not by the terms of the
trust instrument become distributable or vested, then such assets shall be then distributed as
the superior court having jurisdiction shall direct, giving effect to the general intent of the
creator of the trust. [1959 c 146 § 3.]"
WAsH. REv. CODE tit. 11, §§ 11.98.010-.030 (1959).
In its most sweeping form the "wait and see" doctrine uses actual events rather than possibilities to test limitations under the Rule. Br~gy, A Defense of Pennsylvania'sStatute on
Perpetuities,23 TaMP. L.Q. 313 (1950). Cy pres requires a court to approximate the intention
of the donor within the limits of the Rule if his attempted disposition violates the Rule.
Leach, PerpetuitiesReform by Legislation, 70 L.Q. Rav. 478, 490 (1954).
2 Cross, Rule Against Perpetuitiesin Trust Dispositions, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 330 (1959).
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ably has may prove as bad as living with them. Even well-drafted perpetuities

legislation leaves much to be desired from a policy standpoint. 3 Must the

price of improvement include perpetuation of indefensible distinctions between kinds of property and among kinds of future interests?
That the Rule is fair game is usually assumed. It has been successfully at-

tacked at its most vulnerable points.4 In classic form its defenders are few. 5 It
is one thing, however, to attack the Rule insofar as it is inherently defective.
It is quite another to attack it insofar as it is badly handled by courts. And it is

patently misleading to imply that the Rule must be fashioned in such a way
that it can be flouted by a donor, however unreasonable, or violated with

impunity by a draftsman, however inept. There is still something to be said for
keeping madmen with property in check, both directly, by striking down dis3
In Connecticut, Maine, and Massachusetts executory interests are equated with possibilities of reverter and rights of entry to a limited extent, but not entirely. CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. tit. 45, §§ 45-95 to 45-99 (1960); ME. RE. STAT. ANN. ch. 160, §§ 27-33 (Supp. 1959);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, §§ 1-6 (1955). See Note, 54 MicH. L. REv. 723 (1956). Section
3 of the Massachusetts Act is as follows:
"A fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in land subject to a right of entry for
condition broken shall become a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency does not
occur within thirty years from the date when such fee simple determinable or such fee simple
subject to a right of entry becomes possessory. If such contingency occurs within said thirty
years the succeeding interest, which may be an interest in a person other than the person
creating the interest or his heirs, shall become possessory or the right of entry exercisable
notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities. But if a fee simple determinable in land or a
fee simple in land subject to a right of entry for condition broken is so limited that the
specified contingency must occur, if at all, within the period of the rule against perpetuities,
said interests shall take effect as limited. This section shall not apply where both such fee
simple determinable and such succeeding interest, or both such fee simple and such right of
entry are for public, charitable or religious purposes; nor shall it apply to a deed, gift or
grant of the commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof."
The differentiations among the three interests may be demonstrated through two hypothetical cases. A conveys "to the Church in fee simple, but if the land shall cease to be used
for church purposes then to B and his heirs." The executory interest in B is void both at
common law and under the new legislation. The Church takes a fee simple. A conveys "to
the Church so long as used for church purposes, then to B and his heirs." Under the new
legislation, B takes if the contingency occurs within 30 years "from the date when such fee
simple determinable... becomes possessory." If the contingency does not occur within 30
years, the Church takes a fee simple.
Professor Leach thought differentiation a reasonable price to pay for enactment of reform legislation. Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARv. L. REV.
1349, 1355 (1954). Under the new Kentucky legislation equivalence appears to be complete.
Ky. Acts 1960, S. 180, §§4, 5.
4 Professor Leach's direct attacks are available in several sources. Leach, Perpetuities
Reform by Legislation: England,70 HARv. L. Rav. 1411 (1957); Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation, MassachusettsStyle, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1349 (1954); Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective:
Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAiv. L. REv. 721 (1952); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PaoPaRaTY §§ 24.1-24.63 (Casnered. 1952, prepared in collaboration with Mr. Owen Tudor);

MoRRs & LEAcH, THE RULE AGAiNsr PEmurri s (1956). His most recent remarks are

found in Comment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1318 (1960), and Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation: Hail
Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124 (1960).
5 Mechem, FurtherThoughts on the PennsylvaniaPerpetuitiesLegislation, 107 U. PA. L.
11Ev. 965, 966 (1959).
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positions that violate the Rule, 6 and indirectly, by alerting draftsmen to the
7
dangers inherent in intemperate, indiscriminate creation of future interests.
In this paper it is proposed first to summarize briefly the major developments in the law that have occurred relatively recently; second, to demonstrate
in part that the need for reform is less pressing now than it was a half century
ago; and last, to suggest approaches that property lawyers might follow in
making the Rule an effective instrument for policing the transmission of
wealth from generation to generation.
I
During the past fifteen years legislative change in the common law Rule
has proceeded along the following lines:
1) The Rule has been abandoned altogether.8
2) The classic "possibilities" test for the validity of contingent future interests under the Rule has been abandoned and an "actualities" ("wait and
see") test has been adopted.9
3) The classic "possibilities" test for the validity of contingent future interests under the Rule has been abandoned to a limited extent and an "actualities" test has been adopted to a limited extent.10
4) The classic "possibilities" test for the validity of contingent future interests under the Rule has been abandoned to a limited extent and a preferred
rule of construction has been adopted with respect to particular possibilities."
5) The functional equivalence of future interests commonly differentiated
has received limited recognition, and the favored treatment accorded some
future interests under the Rule has been withdrawn by indirection.12
6) A judicial re-ordering of interests in order to comply with the require6 In Clayton v. Burch, 239 N.C. 386, 80 S.E.2d 29 (1954), a devise of realty to the "Body
ars" of a grandson of the testator "down to the Tenth Jenneration" failed under the Rule.
7 Bordwell, Perpetuitiesfrom the Point of View of the Draughtsman,11 RtrrGmas L. REv.
429 (1956).
8

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957).

9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 501-03 (1959); Ky.

Acts 1960, S. 180, §§ 1, 2. New Hampshire adopted the "wait and see" test by judicial decision. Merchants Nat'l Bk. v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953).
10CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.tit. 45, §§ 45-95 to 45-99 (1960); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16, § 197A
(Supp. 1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 160, §§ 27-33 (Supp. 1959); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch.

184 A, §§ 1-6 (1955). Note, 54 MICH. L. REv. 723 (1956); Newhall, Humanizing Rule
Against Perpetuities,93 TRUSTS & ESTATES 724 (1954); Leach, supra note 3.
1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 30, § 153 (a) (Supp. 1959); Note, 55 MicH. L. REV. 1040 (1957).
The Kentucky version of the Illinois act was repealed in 1960 when Kentucky adopted its
"wait and see" and "cy pres" statute. Ky. Acts 1960, S. 180, §§ 1, 2. An Idaho statute abandons the presumption of fertility under a suspension of the power of alienation rule. IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957); Sparks, FutureInterests, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 390, 395 (1958).
12 See note 3 supra.
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ments of the Rule has been made mandatory in some situations where the
Rule has been violated.13
7) Contingent future interests in certain designated groups of persons have
been exempted from the operation of the Rule.14
Nearly all of the legislative changes in the Rule were anticipated by the
courts's and, indeed, in some respects the courts have outdistanced the legislatures in discarding the accumulated rubbish from a thousand years' evolu16
tion of property law.
After little more than a decade of minimal discussion of proposals for reform, 17 and of relatively restricted change effected as a result of that discussion, what can be said with respect to the wisdom of the new legislation and
the likelihood of its general adoption?
First, it should be conceded that Leach's all-out attack on the Rule rests
firmly on a group of precedents that undeniably attained outrageous results
more often than not. One may deplore them, but indignation will not in itself
effect their disappearance. They are a part of our inheritance, and they unquestionably lend impressive weight to Leach's arguments for reform. But Leach's
position with respect to reforming the Rule is that of the advocate. His briefs
are persuasive, but they are not invulnerable.
Many of the perpetuities cases invoking the contempt and ridicule of several generations of lawyers are old.18 That they served to shape the Rule is
common knowledge. They are included in casebooks, taught in classrooms,
and alluded to in texts. They do pose a continuing threat to dispositive provi13 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§501-03 (1959); WASH. REV. CODE tit. 11, §§ 11.98.010-.030
(1959); Ky. Acts 1960, S. 180, §§ 1, 2. An Idaho statute applies cy pres to trust instruments
violating a rule against suspension of the power of alienation. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111
(1957); Sparks, supra note 11.
14 1 CCH PENS. PLAN GUIDE § 1116 (1960).
15 E.g., Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434 (1891) (a gift to grandchildren of the testator who
should be alive when the youngest reached 40 saved by cutting the age to 21). See Quarles,
The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuitiesand
Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384 (1946). Occasional misgivings about cutting down age contingencies have had no appreciable effect. Freund, Three Suggestions ConcerningFutureInterests, 33 HARv. L. REv. 526, 533 (1920) ("A gift at twenty-one is not logically included in a gift at twenty-five, because the former is a larger gift, and the more is not
included in the less.")
16 E.g., Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation District, 51 Cal.2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958);
Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).
These cases are discussed in the text infra at notes 20-24.
17 Professor Schuyler has suggested the abandonment of the "vesting" test for validity
under the Rule and the substitution of a possessory test. His proposals are set forth in an
excellent article. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities DiscardIts Vest ? (pts. 1-2),
56 MICH. L. REv. 683, 887 (1958). Although the suggestion received Professor Simes' earlier
qualified endorsement, SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 80 (1955), it has not been
given legislative recognition.
18 Unfortunately a few are new. E.g., Re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459 (Ch.).
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sions of deeds, declarations of trust, and wills. It is doubtful, however, that the
threat is as formidable today as it perhaps once was. Gray's classic formulation of the Rule19 came at a time when property law made up much of a lawyer's learning. That day is over. The passing of the pre-eminence of property
law requires no elaborate documentation, and that pre-eminence was the very
basis for the rigorous application of the Rule that Gray advocated. Consequently, Leach's brief for reform tells a story, but the account is incomplete.
II
For purposes of illustrating the jumps that modem courts are willing to
2
take in perpetuities cases, consider Brown v. Terra Bella IrrigationDistrict. 0
In 1932 Halbert granted land to the defendant district with a "reservation" of
"all oil and gas and all minerals in or underlying said real property." The deed
further provided that the reservation should continue for the period of twentyfive years from the date of the delivery of the deed to the grantee "and as long
thereafter as oil or gas or petroleum products or minerals shall be produced
...in paying quantities" and that "subject to the reservations and conditions
aforesaid, [Halbert] hereby grants.., all of said real property aforesaid to the
[defendant district], together with ... the reversion and reversions, remainder
and remainders ...

thereof."

In 1955 Halbert by quitclaim deed transferred to plaintiffs all the oil or gas
"in and under, or that may be produced from" the real property involved,
subject however, "to all of the terms, conditions, covenants and agreements"
in the deed of 1932 from Halbert to the defendant district. In 1956 plaintiffs
sought to quiet title. No oil, gas or minerals had been produced up to and
including the commencement of the action.
Plaintiffs contended that the "reservation" contained in the deed of 1932
was really an "exception," that grantor Halbert had attempted to create a
contingent future interest in the defendant district (a "remainder over") that
would vest at a remote time-namely, at the expiration of twenty-five years
and the cessation of production in paying quantities. The "remainder over"
being bad under the Rule Against Perpetuities, title to the oil, gas and minerals
remained in Halbert and passed to plaintiffs under the deed of 1955.
The Supreme Court of California found it unnecessary to resolve the plaintiffs' contentions, for even if they were right with respect to their analysis of
the present and future interests arising out of the deed of 1932, and the invalidity of the latter under the Rule,
we would be required for other reasons to affirm the judgment [for defendant district]. It is obvious that if the plaintiffs' contentions are correct the grantor was...
possessed of a reversionary interest in the oil, gas and mineral rights to take effect
19 GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PEaRrrurris 191 (4th ed. 1942). The first edition appeared

in 1886.
20 51 Cal.2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958).
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in possession upon the expiration of his determinable estate after 25 years and the
cessation of profitable production. The rule against perpetuities ... voids an at-

tempted conveyance as of the time of the execution of the deed. [citation] In the
present case an interest in the reversion was existent in the grantor upon the execution of the deed. Such an interest... is alienable by the grantor. [citation] It was in
fact transferred to the district by the same deed which, the plaintiffs claim, failed to
provide a valid remainder over.... As hereinbefore shown the deed provides for the
transfer of the grantor's real property, "together with the... reversion and reversions, remainder and remainders ... thereof.. . ." [Tihe grantor intended to convey
all of his reversionary rights to the district and... an effective conveyance thereof
was made.21

The result reached by the California court clearly carried out the intention
of the parties to the deed of 1932. Furthermore, the opinion sanctioned accomplishing through one piece of paper what could have been done by two. But
the case cannot be reconciled with Walker v. Marcellusand OtiscoLake Ry.,22
which invalidated under the Rule a remote excutory interest following an
excepted determinable fee.
Brown v. Terra Bella IrrigationDistrictinvolved an inter vivos transfer. Its
counterpart in the testamentary field is Brown v. Independent Baptist Church oj
Woburn.23 There the testatrix in 1849 devised land to a church "so long as they
shall maintain and promulgate their present religious belief and faith and
shall continue as a Church," then to ten named persons who were also the
residuary devisees. In 1939 the church ceased to exist. In a suit to determine
whether the property passed to the successors in interest of the heirs at law of
the testatrix or to the successors in interest of the residuary devisees, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the gift over was void
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The possibility of reverter passed to the
ten named persons under the residuary clause.
In neither the Irrigation District case nor the Woburn Church case is the
equivalence of the executory interest and the possibility of reverter following a
determinable fee conceded. Nothing is made of the fact that it is illogical under
orthodox doctrine to invalidate an executory interest that might vest remotely
and at the same time permit the transfer to a stranger of a possibility of reverter having the same characteristic of remoteness in fact if not in law.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that the judges in both cases were
unaware of what they were doing. Both decisions are explainable on technical
grounds, but the technical explanations are unsatisfactory. As Simes dryly
observed when discussing the Woburn Church case: "[The testatrix] did not
21 Id. at 36-37, 330 P.2d at 777.
22 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919).
23 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950); see 6 AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.62

(Casner ed. 1952).
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die twice ... ."24 Certainly neither decision exemplifies the rigorous application of the Rule that brought forth Leach's scathing indictment.
Are these two cases aberrational? I doubt it. They may not represent the
usual approach to solving perpetuities problems, but they are symptomatic of
a discernible trend in case law. They do not stand alone. Consider, for example, contemporary handling of three kinds of cases frequently before the
courts.

The "unborn widow" construction permits the invalidation of future interests under circumstances which do not normally warrant invocation of the
Rule. A grantor, settlor or testator creates gifts to A for life, then to A's widow
for life, remainder in fee simple to such of the children of A as survive the
widow. Since A might marry a woman not in being at the effective date of the
instrument of transfer, the ultimate gifts conditioned on surviving the widow
25
of A are bad. Such is the standard view.
Even if counsel see the permissible construction inviting invalidity (and on
occasion they miss it), courts are frequently quick to reject it. For example, in
Willis v. Hendry26 the testator created beneficial life interests in his residuary
estate for designated persons including his son. Upon the death of the son,
two-fifths of the income that the son would have been entitled to receive was
to be paid to his wife if living with him at the time of his death. Upon the death
of the wife, the income that she would have been entitled to receive was to be
paid to the lawful issue of the son for 21 years in equal shares; and at the end
of that period, the principal of the fund, "the income of which the wife of my
son would have been entitled to receive," was to be paid to the lawful issue of
the son then surviving; and if there were no lawful issue, principal was to be
added to another trust. The trustees sought construction, asking whether the
wife of the son referred to was the wife the son had when the testator died. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut, noting that the testator had used the terms
"the wife of my son" or "the wife of my said son" twelve times (rather than
the indefinite "a wife" or "any wife"), construed the gift to be to the wife of
the son in existence at the death of the testator even though only in her case
had the testator failed to designate a living beneficiary by name.
Comparable cases are not difficult to flnd,27 but the "unborn widow" construction has not lost all its vigor. In Disston'sEstate28 a testamentary gift to
grandchildren of the testatrix surviving her sons "and their respective wives"
24

Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed?, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 179, n.4 (1953).

25See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 644 (1938).

26 127 Conn. 653, 20 A.2d 375 (1940).
27 In Batchelor Estate, 67 Pa. D. & C. 310 (Orphans Ct. 1949), the court rejected the
unborn widow construction because the testator using the generic expression in his will had
specifically mentioned his daughter-in-law in a codicil. Gifts in remainder not being conditioned on surviving the widow, rejection of the construction was not essential to finding them
good under the Rule.
28 46 Pa. D. & C. 496 (Orphans Ct. 1942).
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failed under the Rule, the court saying, "while possibly the testatrix intended
the substitutionary gifts [of income] to the sons' wives to extend only to such
wives as were living and married at testatrix's death [citations], yet there is no
authority under which a woman born after testatrix's death and married to
her son Horace could have been eliminated .... "29
So too with respect to the "fertile octogenarian"30 and "administration
contingency" constructions. Precedents support Leach's contention that the
Rule is here little more than a trap for the draftsman,31 and judges in some
recent opinions adhere to the older cases. 32 But there are significant departures
from the traditional approach. In Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble33 the
testator died in 1901 survived by a sister Mary, then 84, unmarried and without issue, and by children of deceased brothers and sisters. He devised his
residuary estate to his executors in trust, to pay the income to Sally (a sister of
the testator who predeceased him), Mary, and a named niece, equally, and,
ultimately, to the "nephews and nieces" of the testator and a specifically designated individual, equally. At the death of the survivor of the nephews, nieces,
and the specifically designated individual, principal was to be divided "among
those people who would be entitled to share" in the estate under the laws of
Massachusetts. Mary died in 1906, unmarried. The named niece died in 1907.
The individual specifically designated to share income with the nephews and
nieces of the testator survived all of them and died in 1942. The trustee, seeking instructions, asked whether the "people who would be entitled to share" in
29 A gift of corpus to grandchildren of the testatrix surviving her son and his "widow"
failed in Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 39 A.2d 672 (1944).
30 The "fertile octogenarian" and "unborn widow" cases, though now characteristically
separated (see Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels
from Old Nutshells, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 321, 328 (1955); RUBENSTEIN, INTRODUCTION TO PERPETumEs 11-12 (1959)), are variations on the same theme. In a gift to A (a person alive at

the effective date of the instrument) for life, then to A's children for their lives, remainder in
fee to A's grandchildren, the ultimate gift is bad because A might have children born after
the effective date of the instrument. But the gifts to A and A's children (including afterborn
children) are themselves good under the Rule. In a gift to A (a person in being at the effective date of the instrument) for life, then to A's "widow" for life, remainder in fee to such
of the children of A as survive A's widow, the ultimate gift is bad because A's widow might
be born after the effective date of the instrument. But the gifts to A and A's widow are
themselves good under the Rule.
31 Leach, supra note 25, at 643.
32 In Honeywell Estate, 70 Pa. D. & C. 472 (Orphans Ct. 1950), the testator created a
testamentary trust for his only daughter for life. At her death principal was to be paid to her
children when the youngest attained 25, or, if at the time of distribution all her children were
dead, to nephews and nieces of the testator. When the income beneficiary sought termination
of the trust and distribution of principal to her because income was insufficient to support
her, she was 62 years old and had had a hysterectomy. Her three children were all over 25.
The gifts of principal were held void under the Rule, but invalidity was not essential to the
decision ordering immediate termination of the trust. The daughter of the testator was
found to be the primary beneficiary of the trust. Since the income of the trust was inadequate
to provide for her, the testator's intention could be enforced only by awarding her the
principal forthwith.
33 316 Mass. 294, 55 N.E.2d 446 (1944).
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the estate under the laws of Massachusetts were to be determined as of the
date of the testator's death or as of the time of termination of the trust in
1942. In determining that no violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities had
occurred, The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said, "the will was
executed about two years before the death of the testator. He must be taken
to have known that his sister Mary was then about eighty-two years of age and
was unmarried and had no issue, that all his other brothers and sisters, except
his sister Sally... had deceased, and that there was no possibility that
through the deceased brothers and sisters there could be any nephews or
nieces other than those living when the testator executed the will.... [W]e are
of the opinion that the testator was providing for his sisters and for the
nephews and nieces living at his death.. .. "34
A more striking example of the same constructional approach to reforming
the Rule is In reEstateof Snyder.35 When the testator executed his will in 1911
he had two living children, Andrew, 53, and Elizabeth, 58. Andrew had had one
son who died before the will was executed. Elizabeth had three daughters living at the time of execution. The testator died in 1919. The will created a trust
of the residuary estate, income being payable to Andrew and Elizabeth for
their lives and the life of the survivor, then to the grandchildren in equal shares
for their lives, "and ... immediately after the death of each of my grandchildren as it shall occur, then.., to pay... unto all of my great grandchildren,
living at... the death of such grandchild... per capita... the share.., of
my estate ... held in Trust for the grandchild so dying." Following the
deaths of Andrew, Elizabeth, and one of the daughters of Elizabeth, the
trustee sought construction to determine how to distribute the share of corpus
from which the deceased daughter of Elizabeth had received income. In disposing of a contention that the gifts of corpus violated the Rule Against Perpetuities (Andrew or Elizabeth might have a child or children after the testator's death, and such after-born child or children might have a child qualifying
for gifts of corpus), the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that the
testator's use of the pronoun "she" when referring to grandchildren justified
the inference that he meant only those grandchildren whom he knew at the
time of execution "and not... other possible but improbable grandchildren
37
who might come along later." Wright's Estate36 was cited with approval.
34 "Thus we have a case where an estate which on its face obviously violated the Rule was
saved by a construction adopted to carry out the presumed intention of the testator. I suppose only a lawyer steeped in the technicalities of the common law would criticize it."
Newhall, Nibbling at the Rule Against Perpetuities,29 Mass. L.Q. No. 3, 29, 30 (1944).
35 195 Md. 81, 72 A.2d 757 (1950).
36 284 Pa. 334, 131 Ati. 188 (1925) (trustees of testamentary trust given discretion to pay
income to testators "nieces and nephews"; class construed to include only children in being
at the testators death inasmuch as his brothers were then of advanced age).
37
In Lare's Estate, 57 Pa. D. & C. 163 (Orphans Ct. 1946), Barnsley's Estate, 59 Pa.
D. & C. 653 (Orphans Ct. 1947), and Leonard's Estate, 60 Pa. D. & C. 42 (Orphans Ct.
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In Smith v. Renne,38 a case reminiscent of Belfield v. Booth,39 the Supreme
Court of Illinois rejected the "administration contingency" construction.
There the testatrix put her residuary estate in trust "to be held for a period of
5 years or until such time as in [the trustees'] opinion it could be sold to best
advantage .... When all the Real Estate has been sold then the Trustees will
pay to each of the following the sum of $300 .... [naming them] ... the remainder of the estate to be invested and held as a Trust fund, the income from
which to be divided as follows: [five-sixths to church missions, one-sixth to
Mrs. Rose Renne for life, then to a church mission]." In a construction proceeding brought by the executor, heirs of the testatrix argued that the gift to
the missions violated the Rule because the sale might not occur within twentyone years from the time of the testatrix's death. The court thought otherwise.
The testatrix intended the sale to take place as soon as convenient. It was unreasonable to think she intended the beneficiaries of the $300 gifts to wait
twenty-one years to obtain them. Encumbrances on the real estate would require prompt action by the trustees. In any event, sale within a reasonable
time was required, and a reasonable time would be less than twenty-one
years.
Judicial excision of a provision deferring sale until a conceivably remote
time may save a gift. In Blake-Curtis v. Blake4o the testator directed his executor to preserve his estate and not to sell until he could realize $20 per acre or
the aggregate sum of $40,000 "to be used as I direct." Proceeds of sale were to
be distributed in designated fashions among the testator's children and grandchildren. In a will construction proceeding all parties agreed that the provision
deferring sale violated the Rule, but two of the principal beneficiaries under
the will argued successfully that the restriction on sale could be deleted without destroying the entire testamentary scheme.
In Myers v. Hardin4l the testatrix left her residuary estate to an individual
1947), the court ordered termination of a trust at the request of the life beneficiary where the
vesting of a remainder in such beneficiary's issue was precluded by the unlikelihood of her
having children and no other person or possible person had any interest in corpus. In Lare's
Estate, petitioner was 69, had never had children, was past the menopause, and in ill health.
In Barnsley's Estate, she was 58, had never married nor given birth to a child, was past the
menopause, and in ill health. In Leonard's Estate, she was 57, unmarried and without issue.
Expert medical testimony to the effect that she could not conceive or bear a child was received. These cases are cited in Note,. 26 T amp. L.Q. 148 (1952), as authority for the proposition that the fertile octogenarian doctrine did not obtain in Pennsylvania at about the time
the perpetuities legislation referred to in note 9 supra was enacted. Ideally the rejection of the
doctrine in trust termination cases should be extended to perpetuities cases, but courts might
differentiate on the basis of the context in which the question of indulging the conclusive
presumption of fertility arises.
38 382 I1. 26, 46 N.E.2d 587 (1943).

39 63 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893) (gift conditioned on the executor's settling with the
judge of probate upheld).
40 149 Kan. 512, 89 P.2d 15 (1939).
41208 Ark. 505, 186 S.W.2d 925 (1945).
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in trust with broad powers to sell, invest, and reinvest and to distribute from
principal "as soon as possible" gifts in specific amounts to a sister (who predeceased the testatrix), a half-brother, a Catholic cemetery, and sixteen others,
any excess after payment of such gifts to be paid "to my sisters and brothers; the
survivor or survivors of them, share and share alike." Heirs argued a violation
of the Rule, but the Supreme Court of Arkansas said that distribution as soon
as possible meant "with due diligence and without unnecessary delay in the
42
circumstances, and certainly within the lifetime of the trustee."
The impact of the doctrine can be avoided altogether by characterizing future interests as "vested" and making a discussion of the doctrine irrelevant.
In Hodam v. Jordan4 3 the testator devised property to two of his sons, James
and Charles, in trust with powers in the trustees enabling them to pay off
encumbrances on the lands from income "as soon as convenient." After the
encumbrances were removed, income was to be divided equally among the
testator's children, and in case of the death of any of them, equally among
"the heirs." After the deaths of three specifically designated children and removal of the encumbrances, corpus was devised to the testator's "said grandchildren and to the heirs of Charles ... and... James ... , the heirs of each
taking the share... such deceased parent would take had not this will been
made... it being my intention by this will that at that time and not before,
the title to said real estate shall vest in the heirs of my children or their descendants ... ." The encumbrances were paid off. All five children of the testator died. Plaintiff, an alleged successor in interest of a son of James who had
gone bankrupt, sought partition. The bankrupt contended that his interest
under the will of his grandfather was a contingent interest which had not
passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. A United States District Court in Illinois
found that "heirs of my children or their descendants" meant "grandchildren
or their descendants" and that the grandchildren of the testator took a vested
remainder at his death, subject to divestment. Therefore the interest of the
42 Id. at 511, 186 S.W.2d at 928. In Cambron v. Pottinger, 301 Ky. 768, 193 S.W.2d 412
(1946) the testator's will stated "At my death I want all my debts paid first. I then assign to
my wife... all my... property. At her death I will to St. Annes Church $1,000.00 the
remainder of the estate to be divided equally between my heirs and the heirs of my wife."
Although the Court of Appeals of Kentucky sustained the will when attacked under the
Rule, it is far from clear that the "administration contingency" construction was advanced
by counsel. In Emerson v. Campbell, 32 Del. Ch. 178, 84 A.2d 148 (1951), the testator directed the trustee of his residuary estate to pay to Alice P. Brown from income and corpus
$6,000 in equal monthly installments of $50 each beginning three months after the testator's
death. Should the trustee be able to effect a final distribution of the estate, the balance of the
$6,000 was payable forthwith. The Vice-Chancellor of Delaware found no violation of the
Rule. The monthly payments were due a person in being at the testator's death and were,
taken alone, valid. The provision for payment of the balance when final distribution was
effected did not make the $6,000 bequest remote. "In fact, it accelerates the payment." Id.
at 193, 84 A.2d at 155.
43 82 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. I1. 1949).
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bankrupt was valid under the Rule and passed to the trustee in bankruptcy
through whom plaintiff traced title.44
There are, however, cases reflecting the discredited approach. In Estate of
Campbell45 the testator gave his residuary estate to the four chair officers of a
lodge "being the four chair officers in office at the time of distribution of my
estate," free of trust, but with the expectation that they would devote the
property to charitable purposes. Chair officers were elected annually, and
those holding positions at the time of distribution of the estate were not those
occupying the chairs at the testator's death. The gift failed because distribution
might be deferred beyond the period in gross. A California District Court of
Appeals refused to accept "a high degree of probability [of distribution within
the time required] as a certainty."
III
One of the basic arguments against the adoption of "wait and see" legislation, namely, that wait and see means precisely that-deferring determination
of the validity of an interest until actualities have occurred-is difficult to
meet effectively. 46 There is much to be said for getting controversies settled,
and there is no remarkably persuasive reason for excepting perpetuities problems in this respect. It is a fact that Pennsylvania even before 1947 did refuse
to pass upon the validity of contingent future interests following life interests
prior to the time the life interests had ended, 47but that is hardly a justification
for other states' adopting such a relatively poor practice. Furthermore, the
Pennsylvania technique did not save gifts that were bad under the Rule as
usually applied. Rather, it deferred determination of validity and nothing
more.
An additional argument against promoting adoption of the Pennsylvania
44

In Estate of Swingle, 178 Kan. 529, 289 P.2d 778 (1955), gifts of income to three
specifically named persons "provided... oil, gas or other minerals are produced" on designated tracts of land were saved from attack under the Rule, the Supreme Court of Kansas
finding that the property "vested" at the death of the testatrix. If the donee must survive the
resolution of the contingency, the gift is good. A gift to the grandmother of the testatrix if
she should live on "to receive on distribution of my estate the property hereby bequeathed
and devised to her" was upheld in McCollum's Estate, 43 Cal. App. 2d 313, 110 P.2d 721

(1941).
45 28 Cal. App. 2d 102, 82 P.2d 22 (1938). See Note, 27 CALiF. L. REv. 86 (1938); Note,
37 MicH. L. REv. 814 (1939).
46 See Simes, Is the Rule AgainstPerpetuitiesDoomed?, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 179, 184 (1953).
47 See, e.g., Quigley's Estate, 329 Pa. 281, 198 Ati. 85 (1938); Reed's Estate, 342 Pa. 54,
19 A.2d 365 (1941); Miller Trust, 351 Pa. 144, 40 A.2d 484 (1945); Laucks Estate, 358 Pa.
369, 57 A.2d 855 (1948). Mechem doubts that the practice is widespread. Mechem, Further
Thoughts on the PennsylvaniaPerpetuitiesLegislation, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 979 (1959).
There are occasional cases postponing resolution of the perpetuities problem. E.g., Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R.I. 169, 200 At. 467 (1938); In re Herrmann, 130 N.J. Eq. 273,
22 A.2d 262 (Prerog. Ct. 1941).
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legislation is that it has provoked respectable opposition, making persuasion
of legislators difficult.48 If substantial reformation of the Rule is attainable
without prolonged controversy, there is no point to furthering highly contentious proposals.
The limited "wait and see" legislation is questionable on another ground.
It continues an indefensible distinction between executory interests, on the one
hand, and possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, on the other. 49 Also, it
presupposes the existence of limitations with respect to which differentiation
can readily be achieved, and an ability of counsel and court to detect and appreciate the distinctions hit upon.50 Case law casts doubt on the orthodox view
of the categories of future interests and certainly demonstrates that draftsmen
do not uniformly follow the formulae suggested by the Restatement of Property for the creation of such interests.51
Rather than seek enactment of highly controversial statutes radically
changing the common law Rule, property lawyers interested in improving the
law might more profitably move along the following lines simultaneously.
1) Promote the adoption of statutes stating a preferred rule of construction
in particular instances where the common law Rule has been severely criticized.
The Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar Association has suggested statutes designed to meet certain kinds of cases that
have come under fire.52

2) Encourage the simplification of the categories of future interests through
both legislation and judicial decision. Authorities differ with respect to the
requirement that an executory interest (unlike a contingent remainder) becomepossessory within the period of the Rule or fail.5 3 There being no persuasive argument for differentiating between the two interests for perpetuities
purposes, the orthodox notion should be rejected. Likewise the equivalence of
the possibility of reverter, the right of entry for condition broken, and the
executory interest should be recognized.
48 See Simes, supra note 46; Mechem, supra note 47; Sparks, FutureInterests, 1955 ANN.
SuRVEy OF AMER. LAW 517, 526.

49 See note 3 supra.
50 "Violations are occurring all the time, and moreover, probate courts apparently
pay no attention ... unless there is a contest, but often distribute property under a will
clause which is void on its face." Coil, Perpetuitiesand Restraints;A Needed Reform, 30 ST.

BAR J. CALIF. 87, 88 (1955).
51See Lynn & Ramser, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuitiesto FunctionalEquivalents:
Copps Chapel and the Woburn Church Revisited, 43 IowA L. REV. 36 (1957); Lynn & Van
Doren, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to Remainders and Executory Interests, 27

U. CHi.L. Rav. 436 (1960).
52 See ABA LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK ON PERPETUITIES 12-15 (1958).

53 See GRAY,THE RULE AGAiNST PERPETurmEs § 114 (4th ed. 1942) for the traditional
view, and CAREY & ScHUYLER, ILLINOIs LAW OF FuTruR INTEnRsrS §§ 474 (1941), 480

(Cure. Supp. 1954) for the less orthodox position.
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3) Reinforce the recognition of substance over form by approving and fol54
lowing decisions rejecting differences based on irrelevant choice of method.
4) Recognize the freedom made available to a court by the rules of construction. Urge a construction saving gifts for dependents or the community
unless an intention to tie up property beyond permissible limits is palpable.
5) Seek the amendment of defective perpetuities statutes.
6) Stress drafting techniques that avoid bringing the application of the
Rule into question. Lawyers must cope with the homemade will as they find it,
but they do both their clients and themselves a disservice when they silently
acquiesce in the creation of future interests inappropriate for solving the drafting problem before them. There is often much to be said for avoiding postponed gifts altogether, and especially so as non-traditional means for providing for dependents become commonplace.
CONCLUSION

The Rule Against Perpetuities needs revision, and there is nothing to be
said for postponing modification indefinitely until differences of opinion respecting methods of reform are reconciled. But the Rule ought not to be
blamed for faults inherent in the future interests hierarchy. Indefensible differentiations among contingent remainders, executory interests, possibilities
of reverter, rights of entry for condition broken, and resulting trusts either
antedate the Rule or developed contemporaneously with it. The complexities
55
introduced by the indestructible trust doctrine are of relatively recent origin.
Certainly there is nothing in the generalized language of Lord Nottingham in
the Duke of Norfolk's Case5 6 to justify the judicial ruthlessness dramatized so
effectively by Professor Leach when parading his horribles through the pages
of the HarvardLawReview. For every case serving as a reminder that the Rule
needs improvement there are many showing that it works fairly well when
handled intelligently by counsel and court.57
54
Brown v. Terra Bella Irrigation Dist., 51 Cal. 2d 33, 330 P.2d 775 (1958), discussed
supra at notes 20-22.
55 Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889), established the doctrine in Massachusetts.
56 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
57
In Stanton v. Stanton, 140 Conn. 504, 101 A.2d 789 (1953), the testator left his interest
in a corporation to one Clarence Ralph "upon condition... that he shall pay to my estate
one-third of the net yearly income... for.., such time as it shall continue in operation and
upon its sale or liquidation shall pay to my estate one-third of the net sale price or liquidation
value." The residuary estate was left in trust to use income (and corpus if necessary) to
maintain the family home as a memorial to the testator's father and mother "and for the
benefit of their descendants as long as there shall be any such descendants living" and to aid
poor and worthy descendants. In a will construction proceeding the Supreme Court of Connecticut found no violation of the Rule. The disposition to Ralph reserved no property interest in the testator's estate but merely created a personal obligation in Ralph that the testator
meant to last no longer than Ralph's lifetime. The provision for maintaining the family
home was intended by the testator to benefit only descendants of his father and mother alive
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Whatever form the Rule takes, there are likely to be cases which apply it
badly. There is no reason to believe that from the great mass of litigation before the courts perpetuities problems will be singled out for adroit disposition.
Therefore the most that can be hoped for as a result of modification of the
Rule is improvement in applying an expression on community policy that is
itself a compromise of conflicting notions with respect to the disposition of
property.
Until it is changed, this much can be gleaned from a reading of modem
perpetuities cases: Although the Rule is far from perfect in conceptionSS and
application, it is doubtful that it exists today in Gray's classic form, recent
legislation apart. The meticulous characterization of future interests required
as a prerequisite to applying Gray's Rule seldom obtains today. On the contrary, limitations that on orthodox grounds might be classified as contingent
are called vested with little or no justification advanced or deemed necessary.
Interests once carefully differentiated are consciously or unconsciously assimilated. Evidence accumulates casting doubt on the traditional notion that an
executory interest must become possessory within the permissible period. The
occasions for indulging fantastic possibilities are fewer in number. It is not
unusual to find one piece of paper now doing tasks once thought impossible or
at least achievable only through two.5 9 The proportion of quasi-public wealth
at his death. In another recent case, the testator created a testamentary trust for his wife and
daughter for their lives and directed that "as soon as possible" after their deaths principal be
turned into cash and used for designated public purposes including the purchase of lots for
park additions and the enhancement of the funds of a foundation if "after.., careful study
my executor is convinced that all funds coming into its treasury will be safely and prudently
administered." Funds not transferred to the foundation were to be used for park improvements. The widow of the testator having died, his daughter sought principal as sole heir of
her father, contending that the charitable gifts violated the Rule. All withstood attack, the
Supreme Court of Kansas finding them "vested" at the testator's death. The intention to
benefit the public in one way or another being clear, the result reached is defensible for mere
administrative directions regarding the precise disposition from time to time of charitable
wealth already vested in the public are not thought to create a perpetuities problem; but
arguably the gifts to the foundation and for park improvements were both bad. They were
subject to a determination by the executor which might occur remotely. In re Trust Estate of
Woods, 181 Kan. 271, 311 P.2d 359 (1957).
58 See 1 Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases lxxiii (Yale ed., Selden Society 1957).
59 See Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922
(1950). In Knowles v. South County Hosp., 140 A.2d 499 (R.I. 1958), the testator devised
realty to Knowles for life, remainder to his oldest heir, but subject to conditions ending
when the remainderman attained 40. Failure to comply with the conditions would result in
the property "becoming and remaining part of [the testator's] estate, whereupon it is to be
bequeathed to the Rhode Island State College .... " There was a residuary devise to the
Rhode Island State College, Brown University, and the South County Hospital. The university and the hospital attacked the gift over to the college on the ground that it violated the
Rule. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island avoided any perpetuities problem by refusing to
call the gift over an executory devise. The "reversion" retained by the testator in the event of
breach of the condition passed to the college.
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either specifically excepted from the operation of the Rule or subjected to it
only imperfectly 60 is increasing.
In short, the Rule has been up-dated through the interplay of inextricably
intertwined factors: ignorance or indifference or adroitness of counsel and
court, impatience of powerful groups with inappropriate rules of property, the
press of more important problems requiring attention. Whatever are the reasons for de-emphasis, the Rule is hardly the threat it once was. There is no
bogeyman-even in Massachusetts.
60

"Courts require less to constitute a vesting when a charity is the beneficiary." Note,
27 ROcKY MT. L. Rev. 103, 104 n.13 (1954).

